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Abstract
This paper analyzes the way in which men and women are expected
to behave diﬀerently in an experimental situation. To do so, we con-
centrate on a single topic: altruism. Since the dictator game provides
the most suitable design for studying altruism and generosity in the
lab setting, we use a modified version to study the beliefs involved in
∗We gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the Centro de Estudios
Andaluces (SOCH2.05/43—2006). Martha Gaustad revised the English grammar.
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the game. Our results are substantial: men and women are expected
to behave diﬀerently and both believe that women are more generous.
These two premises aﬀect their behavior.
Keywords: prescriptions, dictator game, beliefs, generosity, gen-
der
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1 Introduction
A vast amount of the literature in the Social Sciences analyzes diﬀerences in
behavior between men and women. In this regard, experimental papers on
cooperative/social issues have demonstrated the existence of gender biases.
In fact, several papers report clear evidence of women’s greater pro-social
behavior, especially in settings where subjects are not conditioned by risk1
and social issues are involved (see Brañas-Garza, 2006). As a result, exper-
imentalists have become increasingly concerned about the consequences of
these gender biases on experimental results. For instance, the percentage
of females within the sample pool might aﬀect results (see Andreoni and
Vesterlund, 2001) or, likewise, the percentage of females in teams could be
also relevant (see Dufwenberg and Muren, 2006). Moreover, it is a well-
documented fact in psychology that males and females behave diﬀerently in
a variety of situations.2
In sum, a large number of papers from a wide range of disciplines have
provided evidence for diﬀerences in behavior (in actions) between men and
1Eckel & Grossman (1998) and Andreoni & Vesterlund [4] report gender bias in favor of
more generous women. Harbaugh et al. [20] obtain identical results using a pool comprised
of children. See also Eckel and Grossman (2000).
2See for example Eagly and Crowley (1986), Goertzel (1983), Glover (1997) and Ones
and Viswesvaran (1998).
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women. In contrast, as far as we know, no previous experimental paper
has explored how subjects perceive diﬀerences in behavior between men and
women.
We study if subjects hold particular beliefs regarding gender identity when
they are in an experimental situation. In other words, we explore if the cat-
egories of “man” and “woman” are unquestionably associated with diﬀerent
ideal attributes and prescribed behaviors. In the case that men and women
are associated to diﬀerent prescribed behaviors, we could then advance one
step further to determine whether the gender eﬀect observed in the lab is
based on identity concerns (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).
This initial aim of this paper is to examine a clear and straightforward
question: Do subjects hold special beliefs for females regarding altruism?
This first approximation is related only to individuals’ perceived generos-
ity.3 To do so we performed a highly intuitive design. Subjects (recipients)
received detailed instructions explaining the dictator game and were then
shown two boxes. The box on the left contained 20 dictatorial allocations
made by 20 females, while the box on the right contained another 20 divisions
made by 20 males. The experimental subjects were told that they would re-
3Perceived behavior in strategic environments remains an open question.
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ceive the amount of money written on one, just one, of the slips of paper
drawn randomly from one of the boxes. The subjects’ task involved choosing
one of the two boxes. They were also asked to fill out a questionnaire.
The results are substantial: i) only one-third of the subjects chose the
"men" box; ii)most of them based their choice on a very “sensible” argument:
females are more generous; iii) a minority consider that general generosity
does not imply higher donations in the dictator game.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the theoretical framework
is discussed in Section 2, while the design is described in Section 3. Results
are shown in Section 4 followed by a discussion of the conclusions in Section
5.
2 The framework
A great many papers report that women behave more generously than men
in a large variety of games: the trust game, the prisoner’s dilemma, public
good and, obviously, in the dictator game. Theorists have explained these
deviations from the predicted Nash equilibrium in terms of reciprocity or
fairness, among other reasons (see for instance, Bolton & Ockenfelds 2000;
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Fehr and Schmidt 1999).
The model proposed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) assumes that subjects
value prescriptions4 in the sense that they suﬀer a loss of utility if they do not
follow the prescribed behavior. This model therefore introduces a new way of
explaining the observed result that women are more cooperative. This kind
of utility function could explain the greater cooperative behavior of females
based on the assumption that the level of generosity in the behavior of women
is socially prescribed as higher than in the behavior of men. So, women have
a higher decrease in their utility (than men) if they deviate from a generous
behavior.
Let us focus on altruism, that is, in the context of the dictator game. In
this game the dictator has to decide how to divide a pie between herself and
a second subject (the recipient). The division she proposes is final, in the
sense that it determines both her payoﬀs and the recipient’s payoﬀs.
As noted above, previous results have clearly shown that women are more
generous in this game. These results could be explained by women’s greater
4Formally, i−subject is endowed with a utility function for subject as: Ui =
Ui(ai, a−i, Ii) with
Ii = Ii(ai, a−i, gi, Pgi)
where ai represents i’s actions, a−i represents other’s actions, Ii represents i’s identity;
gi is i’s gender and Pgi is i’s prescription of behavior of i’s gender.
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sense of fairness, but also, following Akerlof and Kranton (2000), by the
existence of a larger generosity prescription for women.
Let us assume that women believe that they must be generous at some
level and that men perceive that they must be generous at a lower level than
the level perceived by women. Therefore, in order for women to achieve a
utility level that is equal to men, they must donate higher amounts in the
dictator game.5
To apply this model, we must first check that the assumption that fe-
males are more generous than males is true; and, secondly, that the former
assumption is common knowledge to both females and males.
In sum, does everyone believe that women give more money in the dictator
game than men?6 We will now provide some experimental evidence on this
issue by adding a second step to the dictator game in which the recipients
are asked to choose between a female dictator and a male dictator.
5For instance, using a utility function such as Ui = πi(ai, a−i)− ϕidi with di = Pgi −
ai we just need a larger value of the prescriptions (Pgi) for women than for men.
6This paper does not analyze if behavior prescriptions are correlated to the donations
in the dictator game. It only studies if these prescriptions truly exist.
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3 Experimental design and procedures
Two diﬀerent sessions were conducted at the University of Granada with 40
and 28 participants, respectively. Subjects were recruited via posters placed
throughout the University announcing the experiment. Individuals confirmed
their attendance via e-mail. The two experimental sessions were conducted
consecutively. Both experimental sessions were controlled in such a way as
to prevent participants from communicating with one another.7 On average,
each subject earned 8 euros (including a 2.5 euro show-up fee) for a one-hour
session.
Subjects were given written instructions (see the Appendix) which were
also read aloud by the experimenter to ensure that all the participants re-
ceived the same information. Communication between subjects was not al-
lowed.
The experiment was conducted in two diﬀerent phases. In the first phase
subjects were required to make four sequential decisions8. The subjects were
then asked to answer two questions. The first one regarded the reasons for
7There are no statistical diﬀerences between participants’ behavior in the sessions re-
garding the main task of the experiment (Mann-Whitney Z = −0.149, p = 0.881).
8The first part of the experiment involved four steps: choosing a box, drawing a pay-
ment card and making two guesses regarding the money they expected to earn. However,
only the first step is analyzed in this paper. We focus solely on the first step and on the
questionnaire.
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their decisions (in the first task), while the second question was related to
their beliefs about the population in general terms.
Let us now focus on the basic task. Two diﬀerent boxes labeled “women”
and “men” were placed at the front of a classroom. Each box contained 20
slips of paper. Each slip was printed with the donation made by each of 40
dictators (20 women + 20 men) which were randomly selected from an entire
subject pool that had participated in previous sessions of a standard dictator
game.9
The only decision that participants had to make in the task was to select
the box they preferred (either the “women” or the “men” box). A slip of
paper was then randomly drawn from the box for each participant. The
number printed on the slip of paper determined the money to be earned by
that subject.
The initial intuition underlying this design is based on the assumption
that subjects want to maximize their expected payoﬀs and therefore partici-
pants tend to choose the box in which they expect to obtain a higher average
payoﬀ. Thus, subjects’ choices will reveal their beliefs about which sex is
9The above-mentioned dictator game was conducted at the University of Granada in
January 2006. In that game each participant received ten 50-cent coins and was asked
to divide this amount of money between herself and another unknown person. For more
information about the experimental procedures see Brañas-Garza (forthcoming).
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more generous in the dictator game.
Once the subjects finished the first task, they were given a questionnaire.
The questions were arranged sequentially on diﬀerent pages so that the par-
ticipants could not read the second question until they had answered the first
one. Also, they could not go back to the first question once they had answered
the second one. The first question asked participants about the reason for
their decision in the previous task. The second question asked participants,
in general terms, about which sex they thought was more generous.
After answering the questionnaire, payoﬀs were calculated and subjects
were paid privately.
4 Results
We will now explore both the decisions and the beliefs of the participants.
The results are summarized in Table 1 which shows the number of males
choosing males and females and the number of females choosing females and
males. Table 1 contains only the 61 subjects who answered the questionnaire.
The remaining 4 males (3 of whom chose the "men" box) and 3 females (all
of whom chose the "women" box) were excluded because, unfortunately, we
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do not have information regarding their beliefs.
As reported in Table 1, the "women" box was chosen in 62.3% of the
cases. This eﬀect is even more evident when diﬀerentiating by sex (of subjects
choosing the box). We observe that 73.3% of the females chose the "women"
box. In contrast, only 51.6% of the males chose the "women" box. The χ2-
Pearson test supports the assumption that the decision-maker’s sex weakly
aﬀects the choice of box (χ2 = 3.06, p = 0.08).
Table 1: Subjects decisions
females males total
Gender Chosen women 22(73.3%) 16(51.6%) 38(62.3%)
men 8 15 23
total 30 31 61
In cases where subjects’ choices were motivated by their desire to maxi-
mize the expected payoﬀs, the results might be indicative of the belief that
women are more generous than men, especially within the female pool.
We asked subjects about the "reasons for their choice” (Item 1) in the
first task. We will now focus on this issue.
Interestingly, 54 (out of 61) subjects declared that their decisions were
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motivated by a gender-based prescription regarding altruism10. The remain-
ing 7 subjects provided several arguments: 4 gave an irrational explanation
(3 women); two men chose the "men" box because they are men and 1 woman
chose the "women" box due to an analogous “gender pride”. These findings
are summarized in the following result:
Result 1: 88% of the subjects’ explanations are rational arguments based
on prescriptions.
Table 2 explores the relationship between subjects’ choices (by gender)
and their arguments based on prescriptions (by gender). Note that the 7
subjects who did not provide rational arguments have been omitted.
Table 2: Subjects Decisions & Beliefs
females males total
Gender Chosen women 20 (76.9%) 16 (57.1%) 36 (66.6%)
men 6 12 18
total 26 28 54
A salient result was obtained from Table 2:
10Recall that we first asked subjects about their decisions without making any reference
to altruism or generosity (item 2).
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Result 2 (main): Two-thirds of the subjects believe that women are more
generous.
Note that the percentage of females (77%) who chose the "women" box
is considerably larger than the men choosing this box (57%). However, the
Pearson—χ2 test does not support any diﬀerences (χ2 = 2.37, p = 0.12).
Hence, the choice of box is not diﬀerent for males and females.
Result 3: There are no gender diﬀerences regarding the perception of the
gender-based prescription.
Finally, we study the correlation between generosity in the dictator game
and generosity in general terms. To do so, we explore the answers given
for Item 1 (Why did you chose the box?) and Item 2 (Which sex is more
generous?).11 In order to explore this correlation we focus only on the 54
subjects who based their choices on prescriptions regarding altruism. Inter-
estingly, 11 (out of 54) of these participants consider that women (men) are
more cooperative/generous in general terms without expecting more altruist
behavior for males (females) in the specific context of the dictator game.
11Note that although this second question is related to a more general generosity and
not only to the dictator game, the answer could be influenced by previous decisions.
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Result 4: Around 20% of the participants consider that altruism in the
dictator game is not correlated with general generosity.
5 Conclusion
This paper explores a very interesting issue in experimental economics: which
sex is expected to be “more generous”? With this aim we design a very
simple mechanism. Subjects have to choose between two diﬀerent boxes
labelled "men" and "women" placed in a classroom. The boxes contain slips
of paper printed with the decisions made by players in a previous dictator
game. Subjects’ payoﬀs depend on the number printed on the slip of paper.
Subjects only have to choose which box (men or women) they want their slip
of paper to be randomly drawn from. At the end of the decision, the subjects
are given a questionnaire to fill out.
Our results are quite interesting: i) a very large percentage (88.5%) chose
in order to maximize their expected payoﬀs; ii) the majority of the population
(66%) consider that women are more generous and, iii) only a minority (11
out of 54 subjects) consider that general generosity does not imply higher
donations in the dictator game.
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These results are relevant to the literature in three ways:
First, previous papers in the literature —Andreoni and Versterlund (2000)
or Muren and Dufwenberg (2006) among others— have shown that the number
of women within the subject pool is relevant because they behave diﬀerently.
This paper highlights a further salient topic: the presence of females in the
experimental sample could influence results not only because women behave
diﬀerently, but because women are expected to behave diﬀerently.
Second, our results support the prescription that women are more gen-
erous. Observe that this result also supports an alternative explanation for
altruism which is not based on other-regarding preferences, but on selfish
preferences which include prescriptions a là Akerlof—Kranton.
Finally, the high correlation between general altruism and generosity in
the dictator game is important because it reinforces the validity of previous
experimental results which associate dictator givings with real altruism.
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6 Appendix: Experimental Instructions
The purpose of this Class Experiment is to study how individuals make
decisions in certain contexts. The instructions are simple and if you follow
them carefully you will receive a given number of coins at the end of the
experiment. This will be done in a confidential manner as no one will know
how many coins the rest of the participants have received. If you have any
questions, please raise your hand. Aside from these questions, you are not
allowed to communicate with the other participants in the experiment. If
you do so, you will be immediately expelled from the Class Experiment. The
experiment consists of a series of phases that are described in greater detail
below. Each phase is printed on one of the sheets on the table in front of
you. Do not pick up the sheets until the experimenter tells you to do so.
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Decision 1: You will see two boxes at the front of the class. One of
the boxes is labelled “women” and the other is labelled “men”. Each box
contains twenty slips of paper. Each slip has a number printed on it. The
numbers correspond to the money assigned by diﬀerent individuals, both men
and women, who participated in a previous experiment. How that money was
assigned is described below.
In the previous experiment, each participant was given ten 50-cent coins.
Participants were then asked to assign the money to themselves and another
person.
The number that is printed on the slip of paper represents the number of
coins (from 0 to 10 coins, or 0C= to 5C=) that the subject in question gave to
the other subject.
Your decision involves choosing one of the boxes to take out a slip of
paper for you. The number that is printed on the slip of paper corresponds
to the number of coins that you will receive in this part of the experiment.
Decision 1
Of the two boxes I choose: "Men" box "Women" box
When you have finished, please wait.
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Finally, please answer the questions below.
1) Why did you choose the box that you did in the first phase of the
experiment?
2) Who do think are more generous, men or women? Please put a cross
in the box that corresponds to you answer.
Men Women
Why do you think so? You can write as much as you like in the space
available.
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